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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CORRUPTION
Corruption has enormous detrimental consequences for people around the world. Reduc-
ing it requires evidence-based policies. Although a rich and diverse literature from various 
disciplines such as economics, political science and sociology exists that mostly looks at 
corruption on the macro level, social psychological research studying the micro-determi-
nants of corrupt behavior is almost non-existent. In the quest to fill that gap, this dissertation 
makes theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions:
Theoretical. A theoretical chapter discusses the definition of corruption and introduces a 
new conceptual framework that models the decision to engage in corruption as a social 
dilemma. It distinguishes two types of corruption dilemmas: individual (e.g. embezzlement) 
and interpersonal corruption (e.g. bribery), both entailing different, at times even opposing, 
social psychological mechanisms.
Methodological. As a novel behavioral paradigm, the dissertation presents a corruption 
game that models a typical bribery transaction. The game allows experimental research 
into the situational, social, and personal factors that shape corrupt behaviour.
Empirical. The empirical contributions are summarized in three empirical chapters. First, 
three studies using the corruption game illustrate that the perception of what others do 
(descriptive norms) and not necessarily what is considered acceptable (injunctive norms) 
drives corrupt behavior: “I bribe because others are doing it too, even though I know it is 
wrong”. Second, two experiments show that the physical presence of a (non-punishing) 
other person reduces unethical behavior in general and corruption in particular – even 
when the other person is a friend or can co-benefit from the unethical behavior. Third, 
four experiments are reported that examine how corrupt behavior unfolds over time. The 
results challenge the popular explanation of how severe corruption emerges, namely the 
slippery-slope metaphor postulating that corruption occurs gradually. Instead the results 
revealed a higher likelihood of severe corruption when participants were directly given the 
opportunity to engage in it (abrupt) compared with when they had previously engaged in 
minor forms of corruption (gradual). Neither the size of the payoffs, which we kept constant, 
nor evaluations of the actions could account for these differences. At times the road to 
severe corruption is not a slippery slope but a steep cliff.
The dissertation concludes with a General Discussion that embeds these contributions in 
a bigger context, asking: what are the novel insights gained? How can they help to curb 
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